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Abstract
Piracy for ransom remains a significant maritime security threat adversely affecting the interests 
of the shipping industry, maritime trade and the welfare of seafarers. The profits made by pirates 
through ransoms have led to several states, including the United Kingdom, to argue in favour of 
an absolute ban on ransom payments to pirates. These proposals are heavily influenced by similar 
policies adopted in the context of terrorist hostage-taking, in which it is often argued that ransoms 
sustain terrorism and an absolute ban on terrorist financing must therefore be imposed in an effort 
to eliminate terrorist attacks. However, this article argues that maritime piracy for ransom operates 
in a strictly commercial environment that is fundamentally different from terrorism, and therefore 
a ransom ban could cause more loopholes and practical problems than it would resolve. An exam-
ination of the current policies on ransom payments shows that there is no universal ban on piracy 
ransoms and that such payments remain legal and compatible with public policy in the UK. It is also 
explained that a ban on ransom payments to pirates could have significant human rights implications 
for the protection of seafarers, who are the targets of the piracy for ransom model, and it is debatable 
whether an absolute ransom ban can be reconciled with the human rights obligations flag states 
have towards those held hostage on board their vessels. The economic cost of a ransom ban is also 
discussed, and it is explained that a ban could increase industry costs instead of reducing them. It is 
also argued that such a ban is not compatible with the current interpretation of the Marine Insurance 
Act 1906, reinforcing the overall conclusion that an absolute ban on ransom payments to pirates is 
not fit for purpose.  
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1. Introduction 
Piracy remains a major maritime security threat adversely affecting the interests of the shipping 
industry, maritime trade and the welfare of seafarers.1 The sharp decline in successful vessel hijack-
ings in the Gulf of Aden in 2014 sparked hope that piracy had come to an end, but nothing could be 
further from the truth.2 The widespread concern that large-scale piracy for ransom might re-emerge 
due to that the withdrawal of naval forces, relaxed self-protection measures, and a failure to tackle 
the underlying causes of piracy - such as poverty, corruption and unemployment - were vindicated 
by renewed attacks in the Gulf of Aden.3 Between January and June 2016 alone, 17 vessels were 
boarded and two were hijacked in Africa, while 24 vessels were boarded and three were hijacked in 
Southeast Asia.4 During these incidents, 118 seafarers were subjected to violence and 108 of them 
were taken hostage.5 In October 2016, the crew of the FV Naham 3, a Taiwan-owned fishing vessel, 
was released after spending five years in captivity, bringing back to the forefront the dangers of hos-
tage-taking and the suffering of remaining hostages. While precise figures are lacking, following the 
release of the FV Naham 3 crew, it was reported that several pirate attacks had taken place against 
fishing vessels and a number of hostages remained in captivity in Somalia.6 
1 Piracy is defined in Art 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, 
entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS), according to which piracy takes place on the high seas (Art 
101(a)(i)) and therefore certain attacks against ships within the territorial or archipelagic waters of African and Southeast 
Asian States do not qualify as piracy. However, this gap has been filled by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), 
which defines as armed robbery ‘any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other 
than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a 
ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea’ (IMO, ‘Code of Practice for the Investigation 
of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships’ (18 January 2010) Resolution A.1025(26) Annex, para 2.2). In this 
article, the term ‘piracy’ is used to cover both acts of piracy and armed robbery, and the term ‘pirates’ refers to both those 
being suspected and convicted of being involved in acts of piracy and armed robbery. 
2  UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast 
of Somalia’ (7 October 2016) UN Doc S/2016/843, paras 5-8; Christian Bueger, ‘Learning from Piracy: Future Challenges 
of Maritime Security Governance’ (2015) 1 Global Affairs 33, 37-38; CHP Post Online, ‘Denmark pulling out of the fight 
against Somali pirates’ (21 November 2016) <http://cphpost.dk/news/denmark-pulling-out-of-the-fight-against-somali-pi-
rates.html> accessed 19 February 2017. 
3  Reuters, ‘Somali pirates hijack Indian commercial ship in second attack in weeks’ (The Telegraph, 3 April 2017) <www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/03/somali-pirates-hijack-indian-commercial-ship-second-attack-weeks/> accessed 16 April 
2017; Report of the Secretary-General (n 2). For the root causes of piracy in Somalia, Nigeria and Southeast Asia, see An-
drew Palmer, The New Pirates: Modern Global Piracy from Somalia to South China Sea (I.B. Tauris 2014) 7-16; David Ong, 
‘Alternative Approaches to Piracy and Armed Robbery in Southeast Asian Waters and off the Horn of Africa: A Comparative 
Perspective’ in Panos Koutrakos and Achilles Skordas (eds), The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea: European and Interna-
tional Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2014) 269-76; and Martin Murphy, ‘Petro-Piracy: Predation and Counter-Predation in 
Nigerian Waters’ in Douglas Guilfoyle (ed), Modern Piracy – Legal Challenges and Responses (Edward Elgar 2013) 61-90.
4  ICC International Maritime Bureau, ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships’ (1 January – 30 June 2016) 8 <www.icc.
se/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/2016-Q2-IMB-Piracy-Report-Abridged.pdf> accessed 17 February 2017.
5  ibid 10. For 2015, see ICC International Maritime Bureau, ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships’ (1 January – 31 
January 2015) <www.icc.se/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/2016-Q2-IMB-Piracy-Report-Abridged.pdf > accessed 17 Febru-
ary 2017; Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP), ‘The State of Maritime Piracy 2014’ (2015) <http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/reports/
sop2015/summary> accessed 19 February 2017. 
6  Saeed Kamali Dehghan, ‘We had to eat rats, say sailors held by Somali pirates for four years’ (The Guardian, 24 Octo-
ber 2016) <www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/24/we-had-to-eat-rats-say-sailors-held-by-somali-pirates-for-four-years> 
accessed 17 February 2017; Report of the Secretary-General (n 2) paras 3, 9-10.
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The figures show that despite the efforts of the international community to eliminate piracy, the 
‘kidnap for ransom’ model of piracy - the hijacking of a vessel and its crew for the purpose of ex-
tracting a ransom - remains a widespread technique employed by pirates around the world.7 The 
reason is that pirates make significant profits from ransom payments. In 2015 alone, it was reported 
that a total of $1.6 million (USD) was paid in ransom to pirates operating in the Gulf of Guinea, 
while it is estimated that between $340 million and $435 million was paid in ransom for ships and/
or seafarers kidnapped by Somali pirates between 2005 and 2015.8
Concern has been raised that ransom payments to pirates fund more pirate attacks, motivate more 
people to get involved in the lucrative business of piracy, and thus fuel more kidnappings for ransom, 
putting the welfare of more seafarers at risk.9 These fears have prompted some, including the former 
UK Prime Minister David Cameron, to advocate in favour of an absolute ban on ransom payments 
to pirates.10 The rationale of banning ransom payments as a means of preventing hostage-taking is 
not new. It originates from the fight against terrorist hostage-taking and the non-concession policies 
of a number of states that firmly believe that ransom payments sustain terrorism.11 Therefore, they 
have opted to let their nationals taken hostage die instead of paying a ransom to terrorists who may 
7  For a definition of the ‘kidnap for ransom’ model, see the FAFT Report, ‘Organised Maritime Piracy and Related Kid-
napping for Ransom’ (2011) 5-6 <www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/organised%20maritime%20piracy%20
and%20related%20kidnapping%20for%20ransom.pdf> accessed 19 February 2017. 
8  World Bank, ‘Pirate Trails: Tracking the Illicit Financial Flows from Pirate Activities off the Horn of Africa’ (2013) 27-
28; OPB (2015) (n 5) 20; OBP, ‘The State of Maritime Piracy 2013’ (2014) 10 <http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/
files/attachments/SoP2013-Digital.pdf> accessed 19 February 2017. Unless otherwise stated, all sums listed are in US dollars 
(USD). 
9  Secretary Clinton’s Remarks at London Conference on Somalia (2012) <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/
texttrans/2012/02/20120223143901su0.5437062.html> accessed 19 February 2017; Nick Hopkins, ‘Judith Tebbutt case 
puts spotlight on government’s ransom policy’ (The Guardian, 21 March 2012) <www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/mar/21/
judith-tebbutt-spotlight-ransom-policy> accessed 19 February 2017; Robert Rotberg, ‘Combating Maritime Piracy: A Policy 
Brief with Recommendations for Action’ (World Peace Foundation, Policy Brief #11, 26 January 2010) <www.somaliland-
press.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Combating-Maritime-Piracy.pdf> accessed 19 February 2017. 
10  Prime Minister’s Speech at Somalia Conference (2012) <www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-speech- 
at-somalia-conference> accessed 19 February 2017. 
11  BBC, ‘UN urges end to ransom payments to terrorist groups’ (28 January 2014) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-25923084> 
accessed 19 February 2017; UNSC ‘Letter dated 27 October 2014 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant 
to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities Addressed to the 
President of the Security Council’ (29 October 2014) UN Doc S/2014/770, paras 49-59.
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use it for further propaganda and other terrorist activities.12 Arguably, a ban on ransom payments to 
terrorists and pirates has a deterrent effect. However, in this article, it is argued that an absolute ban 
on ransom payments to pirates as the solution to piracy is a rather simplistic approach. 
Terrorist and pirate hostage-taking appear to have some common characteristics, such as the sei-
zure of hostages for the purposes of extracting a ransom, but they also have fundamental asym-
metries that are ignored by those advocating against ransom payments to pirates.13 While terrorist 
hostage-taking involves a spread of political and religious beliefs that lead to ideological conflicts 
and are too controversial to address and too elusive to regulate,14 maritime piracy for ransom in the 
Africa and Southeast Asia regions operates in a strictly commercial environment that allows for 
some regulation. Therefore, it is argued that an absolute ban on ransom payments to pirates would 
have an adverse and multifaceted impact on the shipping industry - especially UK shipping interests. 
This article starts with an analysis of the commonalities and differences between terrorist and 
pirate hostage-taking. This is followed by an examination of the existing international and national 
policies on ransom payments to terrorists and pirates, which will lead to the conclusion that ran-
som payments to pirates are not illegal. This article then analyses the human rights implications 
of a potential ban on ransom payments. It will be argued that piracy for ransom targets seafarers, 
and therefore more emphasis should be placed on their protection. Flag states have human rights 
obligations towards those abducted on board their vessels and a ban on ransom payments cannot be 
reconciled with these obligations.15 The discussion continues by assessing the financial implications 
for the shipping industry, since the likelihood of securing the release of vessels, cargos and crews 
would decrease, but the evolving pirate activities would not. Furthermore, it explains the uncertainty 
surrounding how the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (MIA 1906) and its current interpretation by UK 
12  The US has a long-standing non-negotiation policy which dates back to the Carter and Reagan presidencies and was 
confirmed by the Bush and Obama governments. See Jonathan Powell, Talking to Terrorists: How to End Armed Conflicts 
(London 2014) 15-18. See also the Press Statement by Richard Boucher, ‘International Terrorism: American Hostages’ (U.S. 
Department of State Archive, 20 February 2002) <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/8190.htm> accessed 19 Feb-
ruary 2017. See also Meadow Clendenin, ‘No Concessions with No Teeth: How Kidnap and Ransom Insurers and Insureds 
are Undermining U.S. Counterterrorism Policy’ (2006) 56(3) Emory Law Journal 741. For the UK approach see Count-
er-Terrorism and Security Bill Factsheet <www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/540539/
CTS_Bill_-_Factsheet_9_-_Kidnap_and_Ransom.pdf> accessed 19 February 2017; and Keith Bloomfield, ‘Hostage-taking 
and Government Response’ (2001) 146 Defence and International Security 23. See also the discussion in Yvonne Dutton 
and Jon Bellish, ‘Refusing to Negotiate: Analysing the Legality and Practicality of a Piracy Ransom Ban’ (2014) 47 Cornell 
International Law Journal 299, 309-12.
13  Douglas Guilfoyle, ‘Piracy and Terrorism’ in Koutrakos (n 3) 44-52; Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of 
the Sea (OUP 2011) 147-48; Anna Petrig and Robin Geiss, Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: The Legal Framework for 
Counter-Piracy Operations in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (OUP 2011) 42-44.
14  A clear example is the lack of a definition of terrorism. For the working definition of terrorism see UNSC Res 1566 (8 
October 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1566 at 3. See also Jean-Marc Sorel, ‘Some Questions about the Definition of Terrorism and 
the Fight against its Financing’ (2003) 14 EJIL 365, 366-71. 
15  Sofia Galani, ‘Somali Piracy and the Human Rights of Seafarers’ (2016) 34 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 71, 
81-82; Malcolm Evans and Sofia Galani, ‘Piracy and the Development of International Law’ in Koutrakos (n 3) 356; Urfan 
Khaliq, ‘Jurisdiction, Ships and Human Rights Treaties’ in Henrik Ringbom (ed), Jurisdiction over Ships – Post-UNCLOS 
Developments on the Law of the Sea (Brill 2015) 337.
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courts would protect the losses sustained by ship and cargo owners.16 In light of these considera-
tions, this article concludes that an absolute ban on ransom payments to pirates could cause more 
loopholes and practical problems than it could potentially resolve. In light of the recent attacks in 
the Gulf of Aden, and the widespread concern that large-scale piracy for ransom might return and 
thus exorbitant ransom payments might resurface, it is important to reinforce the position that an 
absolute ban on ransom payments is not the solution to the problem of maritime piracy for ransom.
2. International and national policies on ransom payments  
Before assessing the adverse impact that a possible ban on ransom payments could have on sea-
farers and the shipping industry, it is worth comparing terrorist and pirate hostage-taking and pre-
senting the current policies on ransom payments to terrorists and pirates. This discussion will end 
by reference to the latest initiatives by some of the states that oppose ransom payments to pirates and 
terrorists. 
2.1 Terrorist and pirate hostage-taking 
Distinguishing between terrorist and pirate hostage-taking is not an easy task and various overlaps 
can be identified. First and foremost, the taking of hostages both by terrorists and pirates can fall 
within the Article 1 definition of hostage-taking under the 1979 International Convention against the 
Taking of Hostages.17 The reason is that pirates seize and detain hostages for the purposes of com-
pelling a third party, usually a state or a shipping company, to do an act (pay a ransom) as an explicit 
condition for the release of the hostages.18 Pirate hostage-taking could also fall under Article 3 of the 
1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea (SUA Convention) as pirates unlaw-
fully and intentionally seize and exercise control over a ship by force or threat of force.19 Stateless 
territories, failed states and corruption are also seen as the common denominator in the creation of 
terrorist groups and pirate gangs.20 However, labelling pirates as terrorists and prosecuting them on 
the basis of the anti-terrorism conventions is going a step too far.21 Pirate hostage-taking takes place 
16  See Robert Soady, ‘A Critical Analysis of Piracy, Hijacking, Ransom Payments, and Whether Modern London Insurance 
Market Clauses Provide Sufficient Protection for Parties Involved in Piracy for Ransom’ (2013) 44 Journal of Maritime Law 
and Commerce 1.
17  International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (adopted 17 December 1979, entered into force 3 June 1983) 
1316 UNTS 205 (Hostages Convention).
18  Petrig and Geiss (n 13) 43-44.
19  The SUA Convention (adopted 10 March 1988, entered into force 1 March 1992) 1678 UNTS 201 was adopted in re-
sponse to the seizure of the Achille Lauro by Palestinian fighters, who sought the release of fellow fighters in exchange for 
the hostages, and in an effort to establish criminal jurisdiction over unlawful acts at sea that do not fall within the definition 
of piracy under Art 101 UNCLOS. See Malvina Halberstam, ‘Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the 
IMO Convention on Maritime Safety’ (1988) 82 The American Journal of International Law 269, 276-91. 
20  Palmer (n 3) 71-91. 
21  Guilfoyle (n 13) 47.
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solely for private ends, and pirates have shown in practice that they are willing both to negotiate 
and release their hostages once their ransom demands are met. In contrast, terrorist hostage-taking 
takes place for ideological beliefs, and political demands, such as the release of fellow fighters or 
the recognition of independence of a disputed territory, are almost impossible to meet as a condition 
of release of the hostages.22 Terrorists also take hostages for the purposes of drawing media atten-
tion and promoting their political manifesto, which can be achieved by murdering hostages if their 
demands are not met.23 In addition, pirates hold their hostages in unknown locations, which makes a 
rescue mission difficult, and therefore negotiations and ransom payments might be the only availa-
ble tools for the rescue of seafarers.24 Terrorists, on the other hand, do not hesitate to seize hostages 
in public places, such as schools or shopping malls, and therefore a rescue mission can be a viable 
alternative to ransom payments.25  
For all the reasons set out above, this article argues that terrorist and pirate hostage-taking are fun-
damentally different, and therefore the responses to pirate hostage-taking should not be premised on 
the rationale employed by states in the fight against terrorism. Terrorist and pirate hostage-taking 
require tailored responses capable of safeguarding the lives of hostages primarily, as well as the po-
litical and financial interests at stake, and therefore transposing counter-terrorism policies to acts of 
piracy cannot be the way forward.
2.2 Ransom payments to terrorist groups
The prevention of direct or indirect financing of terrorist acts is considered an effective tool in 
the fight against terrorism, and has been incorporated into a number of counter-terrorism responses 
adopted over the years. One of the earliest collective responses against the financing of terrorism is 
the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which criminalises 
any act of a person that ‘by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or 
collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be 
used, in full or in part’ for committing any act of terrorism including hostage-taking, aircraft hijack-
ing and the seizure of vessels.26 The international community further demonstrated its commitment 
to suppress the funding of terrorism when it established the UN Security Council Committee pur-
22  See, for example, the seizure of the Moscow Theatre by Chechen fighters demanding that the Russian government rec-
ognise the independence of Chechnya in exchange for the release of hostages discussed in Finogenov and Others v Russia 
App nos 18299/03 and 27311/03 (ECtHR, 4 June 2012). See also Section 3.2 below. 
23  See, for example, the scenes of the beheadings of hostages held by the Islamic State, which were widely circulated on-
line by the terrorists. BBC, ‘Islamic State “beheads US hostage Steven Sotloff”’ (3 September 2014) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-middle-east-29038217> accessed 19 February 2017. 
24  For the definition of kidnapping see A. Hunsicker, Understanding International Counter Terrorism: A Professional’s 
Guide to the Operational Art (Universal Publishers 2006) 202-03.
25  For the Beslan School siege see Section 3.2 below. See also Daniel Howden, ‘Terror in Nairobi: the full story behind 
al-Shabaab’s mall attack’ (The Guardian, 4 October 2013) <www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/westgate-mall-at-
tacks-kenya> accessed 19 February 2017.
26  Art 2(a) and Annex of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (signed 9 Decem-
ber 1999, entered into force 10 April 2002) 2178 UNTS 197.  
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suant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaeda and associated individuals 
and entities.27 The Committee assumed the task of overseeing the implementation by Member States 
of the sanctions imposed against targeted individuals and entities associated with Al-Qaeda, includ-
ing an assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo.28 
The plague of hostage-taking by the Islamic State (IS) gave momentum to the international com-
munity to adopt harsher measures against the financing of terrorism through ransom payments. In 
2014, the UK Ambassador to the UN Mark Lyall Grant announced that Al-Qaeda and its affiliated 
groups made at least $105 million in ransom payments for hostages between 2011 and 2013.29 On 
the basis that ransom payments fuel terrorist activities, the Ambassador drafted and put before the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) a resolution urging states to end ransom payments to 
terrorist groups. The resolution, which was adopted unanimously, requires states to stop providing 
directly or indirectly any funds, including ransom payments, to individuals, groups or entities on the 
Al-Qaeda sanctions list.30 The resolution also calls upon states ‘to prevent terrorists from benefiting 
directly or indirectly from ransom payments or from political concessions and to secure the safe 
release of hostages.’31 The commitment of states to end ransom payments to terrorist groups was 
reinforced in UNSC Resolution 2253 (2015). The UNSC unanimously reiterated their commitment 
to securing the release of hostages without ransom payments and expanded the Al-Qaeda sanctions 
framework to include the IS in an effort to end the financing of terrorism.32 It is now well-established 
that financing terrorism through ransom payments is not permitted either by paying a sum directly 
to a terrorist group or indirectly through intermediaries.33
In line with its international efforts, the UK also amended the Terrorist Act 2000 to fill then-exist-
ing gaps in relation to ransom payments at the national level. Section 15(3) of the Act criminalised 
direct and indirect financing of terrorist acts, but did not explicitly refer to ransom payments paid 
by insurance companies. Section 15(3) was amended by Section 42 of the Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Act 2015, which makes payment by an insurer in response to a terrorist demand an offence 
punishable by imprisonment or forfeiture of the amount paid under the insurance contract, but ar-
guably this provision is inapplicable to acts of piracy.34 The UN has taken a clear stance against 
27  UNSC Res 1267 (15 October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1267; UNSC Res 1989 (17 June 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1989.
28  The latest version of the Al-Qaeda Sanctions List established and maintained by the 1267/1989 Committee (2015) is 
<www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list> accessed 19 February 2017.
29  BBC (n 11). 
30  UNSC Res 2133 (27 January 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2133, para 2.
31  ibid para 3.
32  UNSC Res 2253 (17 December 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2253, paras 3 and 5.
33  UNSC Res 2161 (17 June 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2161, para 7. See also the FAFT Report, ‘Financing of the Terrorist 
Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)’ (2015) 18 <www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Fi-
nancing-of-the-terrorist-organisation-ISIL.pdf> accessed 26 February 2017. 
34  Ince & Co, ‘UK Counter Terrorism and Security Bill – does it affect ransom payments to pirates?’ (2014) <www.
incelaw.com/en/knowledge-bank/publications/uk-counter-terrorism-and-security-bill-does-it-affect-ransom-payments-to-pi-
rates> accessed 19 February 2017.
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the payment of ransoms to terrorists, and the UK has allied itself with this approach and appears 
determined to supress the financing of terrorism, even if banning ransom payments means that UK 
nationals are left to be murdered by terrorist groups.35 Despite the emerging consensus on the matter, 
the enforcement of such a ban remains extremely challenging with some states agreeing with it in 
theory, while continuing to make ransom payments to secure the release their nationals taken hos-
tage by terrorist groups.36 
2.3 Ransom payments to pirates 
While the UK appears determined to ban ransom payments to terrorists, its stance on ransom pay-
ments to pirates has not always been so straightforward. The UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and 
Eritrea has repeatedly criticised the inadequacy of the UK responses to Somali piracy, including the 
UK’s opposition to US proposals on piracy ransoms.37 In April 2010, US Executive Order 13536 
concerning Somalia blocked the property of those persons that contribute to Somali piracy, and any 
flows of assets, in the form of transfer, payment, export or withdrawal, to those persons involved in 
piracy.38 The US aimed to further expand this restriction and lobbied the UNSC to list persons and 
entities that pose a threat to the stability in Somalia under UNSC Resolution 1844 (2008).39 Amongst 
others, the US suggested the listing of Abshir Abdillahi and Mohamed Abdi Garaad, known as the 
leaders of Somali piracy. However, the UK deviated from these recommendations and objected to 
the adoption of the resolution.40 Contrary to its stance on ransom payments to terrorists, the UK gov-
ernment opposed the resolution arguing that the UK legal system lacks a defence of duress, which 
could lead to the prosecution of families making ransom payments to save the lives of seafarers.41 
Beyond this humanitarian approach, it has also been argued that the UK, as a hegemonic state of 
maritime business, opposed the proposals restricting ransom payments to pirates in an effort to safe-
guard the interests of UK shipping and marine insurance companies.42  
Ransom payments to pirates have also been examined by UK courts, which concluded that this 
type of payment is neither illegal under UK law nor incompatible with public policy. In the case 
35  Karen Yourish, ‘The Fates of 23 ISIS Hostages in Syria’ (The New York Times, 10 February 2015) <www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2014/10/24/world/middleeast/the-fate-of-23-hostages-in-syria.html> accessed 19 February 2017.
36  Kashmira Gander, ‘Isis hostage threat: Which countries pay ransoms to release their citizens?’ (Independent, 3 Sep-
tember 2014) <www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/isis-hostage-threat-which-countries-pay-ransoms-to-release-
their-citizens-9710129.html> accessed 26 February 2017; Timothy McGrath, ‘These are the countries that have (probably) 
paid hostage ransom to the Islamic State’ (Global Post, 28 January 2015) <www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/war/150121/
these-are-the-countries-have-probably-paid-ransom-the-islamic-state> accessed 26 February 2017.
37  UNSC ‘Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002’ (13 July 
2012) UN Doc S/2012/545, paras 30-31. See also the discussion in Achilles Skordas, ‘The Dark Side of Counter-Piracy Pol-
icies’ in Koutrakos (n 3) 318-20.  
38  Executive Order 13536 concerning Somalia – Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in So-
malia (2010) <www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=87737> accessed 19 February 2017. For the Order, and other relevant US 
legislation on ransoms, see Lawrence Rutkowski, Bruce Paulsen and Jonathan Stoian, ‘Mugged Twice?: Payment of Ransom 
on the High Seas’ (2010) 59 American University Law Review 1425.
39  UNSC Res 1844 (20 November 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1844, para 8. 
40  House of Commons - Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘Piracy off the coast of Somalia - Tenth Report of Session 2010–12’ 
(2012) <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmfaff/1318/1318.pdf> para 114. 
41  ibid; for a discussion on the defence of duress in US criminal law, see Dutton and Bellish (n 12) 316-20.
42  Report of the Monitoring Group (n 37) Annex 4, 34, 211.
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of Royal Boskalis, the Court of Appeal examined an appeal brought by five Dutch companies that 
owned and operated a dredging fleet, which was insured against war risks by the defendants under 
an insurance contract in the Ship and Goods (SG) form set out in Schedule 1 to the MIA 1906 con-
taining a ‘sue and labour’ clause.43 The dredging fleet was operating in an Iraqi port, but, following 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the UN imposed sanctions on Iraq, which responded by seizing all the 
assets of companies operating on its land, including the plaintiffs’ dredging fleet and employees. 
The plaintiffs had to pay large amounts of money for the demobilisation of the fleet and the release 
of their employees and sought to recover their losses under the ‘sue and labour’ clause. The legality 
of the ransom payment was examined by Lord Justice Phillips who argued that pursuant to Section 
78(4) MIA 1906, the assured has a duty to take reasonable steps to mitigate the loss, which includes 
the payment of a reasonable ransom that has regard to the value of the property at risk. More specif-
ically, Lord Justice Phillips argued that:
[t]he terms in which the duty under section 78(4) is expressed are wide enough on their natural 
meaning to embrace expenditure necessary to procure the release of a vessel that has been seized 
and I see no reason of policy or practice why they should not do so. If that is right, then it would be 
strange indeed if such expenditure did not fall within the sue and labour clause. In my judgment the 
assumption […] that payment of a ransom, if not itself illegal, is recoverable as an expense of suing 
and labouring is well founded.44
Lord Justice Phillips’ reasoning touched upon the compatibility of ransom payments with public 
policy, but he did not elaborate further on this issue. This does not mean that UK courts have left any 
doubts regarding this issue, as is evidenced by the Bunga Melati Dua case.45 The case concerned the 
seizure of a vessel by Somali pirates and the appellant’s appeal against a decision that the capture 
of a vessel by pirates did not create an immediate total loss of the cargo. The appellant argued that 
regardless of the prospects of recovery of a vessel, the payment of a ransom should not be taken 
into account for calculating the possibilities of recovery, as there was no duty of an insured under 
Section 78(4) MIA 1906 to pay the ransom. The appellant further argued that, in any case, ransom 
payments were contrary to public policy.46 The latter claim was rejected by the Court of Appeal and 
Lord Justice Rix reasoned that: 
[t]here is thus something of an unexpressed complicity: between the pirates, who threaten the liberty 
but by and large not the lives of crews and maintain their ransom demands at levels which industry 
can tolerate; the world of commerce, which has introduced precautions but advocates the freedom 
to meet the realities of the situation by the use of ransom payments; and the world of government, 
which stops short of deploring the payment of ransom but stands aloof, participates in protective na-
43  Royal Boskalis Westminster N.V. and Others v Mountain and Others [1999] QB 674.
44  ibid 720. Ransom payments to pirates used to be an offence in 1782 under the Ransom Act (22 Geo. III c. 25) which has 
been repealed. For this act and subsequent legislation banning ransom payments to pirates, see Peter MacDonald Eggers QC, 
‘The Insurance Protection against Piracy’ in Guilfoyle (n 3) 289.
45  Masefield AG v Amlin Corporate Member Ltd [2011] 1 WLR 2012. See also the discussion in MacDonald Eggers QC, 
ibid 290-95.
46  Masefield AG (2011) para 2. 
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val operations but on the whole is unwilling positively to combat the pirates with force. Mr Williams 
described it as a ‘fragile status quo’. In these morally muddied waters, there is no universally recog-
nised principle of morality, no clearly identified public policy, no substantially incontestable public 
interest, which could lead the courts, as matters stand at present, to state that the payment of ransom 
should be regarded as a matter which stands beyond the pale, without any legitimate recognition. 
There are only elements of conflicting public interests, which push and pull in different directions, 
and have yet to be resolved in any legal enactments or international consensus as to a solution, save 
that of wary watchfulness, the deployment of naval resources as a form of law enforcement or po-
licing operation, and a regard for ‘a comprehensive approach, seeking to address political, economic 
and security aspects of the crisis in a holistic way’.47
The excerpt summarises in an eloquent manner the complexities of the fight against piracy and the 
practical benefits of ransom payments to shipping interests. The decision of the Court of Appeal 
not to bar or otherwise hinder ransom payments to pirates has been well-received by the shipping 
industry because it gives shipowners room to manoeuvre as regards how to negotiate and secure the 
release of the crew, vessel and cargo.48 
In contrast, the efforts of the UK government to ban ransom payments to pirates found no support 
by states nor the shipping industry. In February 2012, David Cameron told the London Conference 
on Somalia that ransom payments to pirates should be banned.49 To that end, Cameron established 
the International Piracy Ransoms Task Force, the objective of which is:
to develop a greater understanding of the payment of ransoms in cases of piracy, in order to put 
forward policy recommendations to the international community as to how to avoid, reduce or pre-
vent the payment of ransoms. The ultimate goal of this effort is to reach a point where pirates are 
no longer able to profit from ransom payments and thus abandon the practice of kidnapping for 
ransom.50 
Despite the justifications provided for banning piracy ransom payments, only 14 states participated 
in the Task Force and some of the largest flag and ship register states, such as the Marshall Islands, 
47  ibid para 71.
48  Philip Roche and Peter Glover, ‘Public policy and the payment of ransoms - Masefield AG v Amlin Corporate Member 
[2011] EWCA Civ 24’ (2011) <www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/48452/public-policy-and-the-pay-
ment-of-ransoms-masefield-ag-v-amlin-corporate-member-ewca-civ-24> accessed 26 February 2017; John Knott, ‘Somali 
Piracy: The Effect of Ship Hijacking on Marine Insurance Policies’ (2010) <www.idaratmaritime.com/wordpress/?p=246> 
accessed 26 February 2017; James Gosling and Richard Neylon, ‘Banning ransom payments to Somali pirates would outlaw 
the only method a shipowner has to remove his crew from harm’s way and rescue his vessel and cargo’ (Lloyd’s List, 1 No-
vember 2011) <www.hfw.com/Banning-ransom-payments-to-somali-pirates> accessed 26 February 2017.
49  Prime Minister’s Speech (n 10). 
50  London Conference on Somalia: Communique (23 February 2012) <www.gov.uk/government/news/london-confer-
ence-on-somalia-communique--2> accessed 19 February 2017; Final Report of the International Piracy Ransoms Task Force 
(11 December 2012) excerpts available at <https://piracy-law.com/2013/01/20/the-report-of-the-international-piracy-ran-
soms-task-force-is-available/> accessed 1 April 2017. 
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the Bahamas and Greece, are missing from the list of participants.51 At the same time, the shipping 
industry expressed its concern over the suggested ban on humanitarian, financial and environmental 
grounds.52 The lack of support possibly justifies the constrained recommendations published by the 
Task Force in its final report to the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia in 2012, which 
are not reflective of Cameron’s ambitions to eliminate ransom payments. 
The Task Force recommended the development of strategic partnerships between flag states, the 
private sector, law enforcement agencies and military responders in an effort to break the piracy 
business model and prepare for potential hostage situations, better coordination of information-shar-
ing to provide evidence to pursue and prosecute all involved in piracy, and implementation of an-
ti-piracy measures, including better compliance with Best Management Practices.53 Missing from 
the report are clear-cut policy recommendations that could lead to an absolute ban on ransom pay-
ments. In other words, the recommendations were tailored to accommodate the UK government’s 
interest restricting the profits made by pirates from ransom payments, as well as the needs of the 
shipping industry to retain flexibility in handling hostage-taking situations. The latest UK policy 
paper on piracy off the coast of Somalia also shows that the government did not push forward a ban 
on ransom payments made to pirates.54 On the contrary, according to unofficial reports, the UK gov-
ernment confirmed that ransom payments to pirates will remain legal, and the UK Shipping Minister 
John Hayes stated that ‘[i]t is already an offence to make ransom payments to terrorists, [but] the 
situation is different in piracy cases. Whilst the government strongly advises against making ransom 
payments to pirates, doing so is not illegal under UK law.’55
The indecisiveness of the UK government in relation to piracy ransoms suggests that it is aware of 
the implications an absolute ban on piracy ransom payments could have for shipping interests. The 
shipping industry has firmly opposed a ban and the following discussion explains that the concerns 
expressed by the maritime world are not baseless. As explained below, outlawing ransom payments 
to pirates could have serious human rights implications for seafarers, especially those taken hostage, 
and could cause detrimental inconsistencies in the way the current marine insurance framework 
operates in the UK.56
51  The task force was constituted of 14 members: Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Liberia, Malaysia, Norway, 
Panama, Spain, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States: House of Commons Hansard, 
‘International Piracy Ransoms Task Force’ (Written Statements Vol 555, 12 December 2012) <https://hansard.parliament.uk/
Commons/2012-12-12/debates/12121236000016/InternationalPiracyRansomsTaskForce> accessed 26 February 2017.
52  See the letter of the Round Table of International Shipping Association (14 March 2012) <www.intertanko.com/Global/
Prime%20Minister%20David%20Cameron%20140312.pdf> accessed 19 February 2017.
53  Piracy Ransoms Task Force publishes recommendations (11 December 2012) <www.gov.uk/government/news/pira-
cy-ransoms-task-force-publishes-recommendations> accessed 19 February 2017.
54  2010 to 2015 government policy: piracy off the coast of Somalia (Policy paper, 8 May 2015) <www.gov.uk/government/
publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-piracy-off-the-coast-of-somalia/2010-to-2015-government-policy-piracy-
off-the-coast-of-somalia> accessed 19 February 2017.
55  World Maritime News, ‘UK Keeps Piracy Ransom Payment Legal’ (21 January 2015) <http://worldmaritimenews.com/
archives/150000/uk-keeps-piracy-ransom-payment-legal/> accessed 19 February 2017.
56  See Sections 3.2 and 4.1 below.
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3. Ransom payments and the human rights of seafarers 
The protection of the human rights of seafarers has been one of the main arguments by shipping 
companies against the ban on piracy ransoms. The Round Table of International Shipping Associa-
tions has clearly stated that banning ransoms is equal to leaving seafarers to the ‘mercy of violent or-
ganised crime in a society where life has little value.’57 Other maritime analysts suggest that paying 
a ransom is the ‘only hope’ a shipowner has for securing the release of crew and vessel in practice.58 
Courts have also stressed how important negotiations and ransom payments are for safeguarding the 
human rights of hostages. While there is no clear-cut obligation imposed on flag states to pay ran-
soms to secure the release of hijacked vessels and crews, it is argued here that flag states bear human 
rights obligations towards those on board seized vessels and questioned how flag states will be able 
to respond to these obligations if ransom payments are banned.59 
3.1 The nature of piracy for ransom 
Piracy for ransom, by definition, has a specific aim: the taking of hostages for the purpose of ex-
tracting a ransom payment. Given that seafarers are the target of pirates, the human cost of piracy 
should be the focal point. However, as the author has highlighted elsewhere, counter-piracy meas-
ures lack a victim’s perspective, which could enhance protection of the human rights of seafarers, 
and the decision to push for an absolute ban on ransom payments further fails to consider the human 
cost of piracy as seafarers could suffer and die as a result.60
Empirical data shows that, between 2010 and 2015, almost 9,705 seafarers were attacked in the 
Indian Ocean and 2,060 were taken hostage, 78 of whom remained in captivity in 2015.61 While 
Somali piracy was declining, West African pirates became more active and 2,949 seafarers were 
attacked and 493 were taken hostage between 2013 and 2015.62 In addition, almost 7,328 seafarers 
were subjected to attacks in the Southeast Asia region in 2014-15 and 167 were detained on board hi-
jacked vessels in 2015 alone.63 The accounts of released hostages also revealed the increasing threats 
57  Letter of the International Shipping Associations (2012) (n 52).
58  Charles Marts, ‘Piracy Ransoms - Conflicting Perspectives’ (One Earth Future Foundation Working Paper, 2010) 8-13 
<http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/ransom-_charlie_marts.pdf> accessed 19 February 2017; Gosling and 
Neylon (n 48); Ioannis Chapsos, ‘UK banning paying ransoms to terrorists, pirates?’ (Maritime Executive, 5 December 
2014) <www.maritime-executive.com/article/UK-banning-paying-ransoms-to-terrorists-pirates-2014-12-05> accessed 26 
February 2017; Ince & Co, ‘Paying Ransoms – Could the US make this more difficult?’ (2011) <incelaw.com/en/documents/
pdf_library/strands/shipping/article/paying-ransoms-could-the-us-make-this-more-difficult.pdf> accessed 26 February 2017. 
59  See (n 15) above.
60  Galani (n 15) 71-98.
61  ICC (n 4) 10. For an analysis of the human cost of piracy see OBP ‘The State of Maritime Piracy 2015’ (6 June 2016) 
13-14 <http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/State_of_Maritime_Piracy_2015.pdf> accessed 8 May 2017; OBP 
(2015) (n 5) 27-28; OBP (2014) (n 8) 2.
62  OBP (2016) ibid 30-31; OBP (2015) ibid 67-68; OBP (2014) ibid 4-5.
63  OBP (2016) ibid 42; OBP (2015) ibid 78-79.
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and violence that seafarers have to deal with on a regular basis. Whether detained while pirates seek 
to secure a ransom or loot the cargo, seafarers are subjected to cruelties and indignities.64 Hostages 
are detained in cramped and squalid conditions, suffer from malnutrition and a lack of drinkable 
water, do not have access to any medical support, are punched, pushed or slapped, and are often 
used as human shields.65 Captain Krzystof Kozlowski, who was taken hostage aboard the MV Szafir 
while sailing in the Gulf of Guinea, described his ordeal stating that ‘[the pirates] were aiming at us 
with machine guns. Right between the eyes. There was not any possibility to do anything. We had 
to adjust to them, it was the only chance to survive.’66 The psychological impact on seafarers of hos-
tage-taking as well as of crossing sea routes contaminated with piracy is also irreversible.67 Almost 
all seafarers who transited the Western Indian Ocean Region High Risk Area (HRA),68 were attacked 
by pirates and taken hostage have suffered from various forms of depression and post-trauma dis-
orders.69 The psychological abuses hostages undergo cause further difficulties in them reintegrating 
into their families and communities. Chirag Bahri, one of the hostages released from the Marida 
Marguerite, commented on the difficulties he encountered after his release: 
[s]ome men return to find their marriages broken off; mothers have died or fathers have died because 
they couldn’t take the stress. When they come back it’s to a totally new life. It’s totally different to 
the life they left behind. Often a seafarer’s own behaviour has changed from spending so long with 
pirates. He has become more bad-tempered, more aggressive.70
Maritime piracy for ransom poses a significant threat to seafarers. The abuses seafarers are sub-
jected to show that pirates use them as their ‘bargaining chips’ and the accounts of released seafarers 
confirm that pirates do not hesitate to subject them to physical and/or psychological abuse if it will 
enable a ransom payment. The analysis of the human cost of piracy shows that hostage-taking could 
64  Detention of the crew while seafarers loot the cargo and other valuables is mostly common in Southeast Asia. OBP 
(2016) ibid. See Ong (n 3) 267-98 and Robert Beckman, ‘Piracy and armed robbery against ships in Southeast Asia’ in Guil-
foyle (n 3) 13-34.
65  UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of 
Somalia’ (12 October 2015) UN Doc S/2015/776) para 8; UNODC, ‘Hostage Support Programme (Project 045) (Part of the 
Maritime Crime Programme) - Lessons Learned After Action Review Improvement Plan’ (2014) 7-8, 19. See also Galani (n 
15) 76-77, and Barry Hart Dubner and Kimberly Chavers, ‘The Dilemma of Piratical Ransoms: Should They be Paid or Not? 
On the Human Rights of Kidnapped Seamen and Their Families’ (2013) 18 Barry Law Review 297, 309-13.
66  OBP (2016) (n 61). 
67  Michael Garfinkle, Craig Katz and Janaka Saratchandra, ‘The psychological impact of piracy on Seafarers’ (2012) 8 
<http://seamenschurch.org/sites/default/files/sci-piracy-study-report-web_1.pdf> accessed 17 February 2017; OBP (2015) (n 
5) 32-33, 87-90; Conor Seyle, ‘After the Release: The Long-Term Behavioural Impact of Piracy on Seafarers and Families’ 
(2016) 16-19 <http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/after-release-impact-seafarers.pdf> accessed 19 
February 2017.
68  According to the definition given by the IMO, the HRA ‘defines itself by where pirate activity and/or attacks have taken 
place. See IMO, ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in waters off Somalia’ (MSC.1/Circ.1339) (2011) 4.
69  Garfinkle, Katz and Saratchandra (n 67) 8; OBP (2015) (n 5) 32-33, 87-90; Seyle (n 67) 16-19.
70  Ben Farmer, ‘The human cost of piracy: broken victims of violence’ (The Telegraph, 10 February 2014) <www.tele-
graph.co.uk/sponsored/culture/captain-phillips-film/10388296/somali-piracy-victims.html> accessed 26 February 2017.
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violate the human rights of seafarers as their right to life is constantly threatened, they are detained, 
they are physically and psychologically abused, and they are deprived of any form of privacy.71 A 
possible ban on ransom payments could further aggravate the suffering of seafarers as flag states 
would miss the opportunity to secure the release of crew members from the hands of armed and 
violent pirate gangs. 
3.2 Ransom payments from a victim’s perspective 
As explained, at least for the time being, there is no universal ban on ransom payments to pirates 
and the practice remains both legal and compatible with public policy in the UK. What has not been 
discussed is the emphasis the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has placed on negotia-
tions and concessions and the importance of ransom payments discussed in the jurisprudence of UK 
courts as a means of safeguarding the human rights of hostages. 
The ECtHR has only examined the issue of negotiations and concessions in the context of ter-
rorism, but the emphasis it has placed on them for the safe release of hostages echoes that of the 
shipping industry and UK courts in underlining the importance of ransom payments for seafarers. 
Regarding negotiations, states retain wide sovereign powers in the fight against terrorism and there 
is no uniform policy requiring states to either negotiate or not to negotiate. In the landmark case of 
Finogenov and Others v Russia, the Russian government’s response to the Moscow theatre siege, 
namely its compliance with the right to life, was examined. The victims and their families filed a 
complaint against Russia with the Strasbourg Court arguing, inter alia, that the lack of professional 
negotiations with the hostage-takers constituted a breach of the right to life.72 However, the ECtHR 
deferred when asked to adjudicate on negotiation policies. The Court offered a wide margin of ap-
preciation to states and concluded that it is:
far beyond the competence of this Court, which is not in a position to indicate to member States the 
best policy in dealing with a crisis of this kind: whether to negotiate with terrorists and make conces-
sions or to remain firm and require unconditional surrender. Formulating rigid rules in this area may 
seriously affect the authorities’ bargaining power in negotiations with terrorists.73 
Nevertheless, the ECtHR has repeatedly highlighted the significance of negotiations and has never 
fully released states from an obligation to negotiate for the sake of the hostages lives, since negoti-
ations can be a prerequisite to human rights compliant rescue operations. In Tagayeva v Russia, in 
which the Court was asked to examine the legality of the Russian rescue operation during the Beslan 
school siege that claimed the lives of more than 300 people, the Court stated that ‘in a situation 
71  Galani (n 15) 73-77; UNGA ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Ben Emmerson’ (4 June 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/20/14, paras 11-14; 
UNGA ‘Report of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee - Human rights and issues related to terrorist hostage-tak-
ing’ (4 July 2013) UN Doc A/HRC/24/47, paras 23-24. 
72  Finogenov and Others v Russia (2012) para 167.
73  ibid para 223.
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which involves a real and immediate risk to life and demands the planning of a police and rescue op-
eration, one of the primary tasks of the competent authorities should be to set up a clear distribution 
of lines of responsibility and communication’ amongst the responsible agencies, which are tasked 
with, inter alia, ‘choosing negotiation strategies’.74 The Court’s case law on military operations and 
rescue missions has also established that military operations aimed at rescuing hostages must be 
planned with accuracy in advance so as to ensure that lethal force is only used as a last resort and 
only if it is strictly necessary to save innocent lives.75 It has also stated that the primary aim of a 
rescue operation should be the protection of hostages from unlawful violence.76 
In light of this jurisprudence, this article concludes that a failure of authorities to negotiate before 
conducting a rescue mission might breach Convention rights. During the negotiation stage, authori-
ties have the opportunity to evaluate the situation and gather invaluable information about the num-
ber of hostages and their conditions, the number of hostage-takers, their equipment, their motives 
and the location.77 Authorities can also influence hostage-takers to shift their unrealistic demands 
into more feasible requests, such as food and water.78 This can also tire and defeat the confidence of 
hostage-takers and pave the way for their surrender or a successful rescue operation.79 Skipping this 
stage means that states may miss the opportunity to properly plan a rescue mission. Probing into the 
hostage-taking situation allows authorities to assess the volatile factors that can adversely affect the 
outcome of a rescue mission and ensure the protection of the lives of hostages.80  Negotiations with 
pirates seem to be vital for naval forces too, as the latter often have to operate in unfriendly waters, 
under extremely unfavourable weather conditions and unable to deal with the unpredictable reac-
tions of pirates.81 This shows that prior negotiations could assist them in planning and conducting a 
human rights compliant rescue mission for the release of seafarers.
74  Tagayeva and Others v Russia Apps nos 26562/07, 14755/08, 49339/08, 49380/08, 51313/08, 21294/11, and 37096/11 
(ECtHR, 13 April 2017) para 570.
75  McCann v UK App no 18984/91 (ECtHR, 27 September 1995) paras 150, 200; Andronicou and Constantinou v Cyprus 
App no 86/1996/705/897 (ECtHR, 9 October 1997) paras 183-85, 213.
76  Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v Russia App nos 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00 (ECtHR, 24 February 2005) para 
171.
77  Guy Olivier Faure, ‘Negotiating with Terrorists: A Discrete Form of Diplomacy’ (2008) 3 The Hague Journal of Diplo-
macy 179, 185.
78  See Adam Dolnik and Keith Fitzgerald, ‘Negotiating Hostage Crises with the New Terrorists’ (2011) 34 Studies in Con-
flict & Terrorism 267, 267-68.
79  William Zartman, ‘Negotiating with Terrorists’ (2003) 8 International Negotiations 443, 447-48; Dolnik and Fitzgerald, 
ibid 274-75; Richard Hayes, Stacey Kaminski and Steven Beres, ‘Negotiating the Non-Negotiable: Dealing with Absolutist 
Terrorists’ (2003) 8 International Negotiations 451, 454.
80  Adam Dolnik, ‘Negotiating the Impossible? The Beslan Hostage Crisis’ (The Royal United States Services Institute for 
Defence and Security Studies Whitehall Report 2-07, 2007) 22-24.
81  For example, Somali pirates have used seafarers as human shields during rescue operations or have murdered hostages 
in response to rescue efforts, see UN News Centre, ‘UN agency deplores pirates’ use of seafarers as human shields’ (19 
April 2011) <www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=38147#.WLMNyjuLTIU> accessed 26 February 2017, and The 
Telegraph, ‘Somali pirates sentenced to life in prison for killing four Americans’ (3 August 2013) <www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10220279/Somali-pirates-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-for-killing-four-Americans.html> 
accessed 26 February 2017. See also the discussion in Galani (n 15) 88-89.
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The approach of the European Union Committee of the House of Lords further strengthens this 
point. When the Committee examined the EU’s Operation Atalanta, and more specifically issues of 
‘hostage taking and ransoms’ in the region, it concluded that: 
[w]e understand that skilled ransom negotiators can help to keep risk to life and vessels, as well as 
ransom payments, to a minimum. Where ship owners intend to pay a ransom to recover their vessel 
and crew, we recommend that they use experienced and effective ransom negotiators. Where insur-
ance policies do not already insist on experienced negotiators, they should do so.82
In addition to the importance of negotiations, UK courts have also stressed the vitality of ransom 
payments for the protection of seafarers in the Royal Boskalis and Bunga Melati Dua cases. In Royal 
Boskalis, the issue was discussed by Lord Justice Phillips, who argued that:
[p]reservation of life cannot be equated with preservation of property. Provided that the expenses 
can reasonably be said to have been incurred for the preservation of the property, it does not seem to 
me either sound in principle or desirable that the assured should be penalised if they were sufficiently 
concerned for lives at risk to have been concerned to save not only their property but those lives.
Although there is not a direct reference to the human rights of seafarers, the quote suggests that 
seafarers do have a right to life – a right that should be protected and prioritised even over the right 
of shipowners to protect their property. The issue was also discussed by High Court Justice Steel in 
Bunga Melati Dua.83 The judge relied on the current state of Somalia, as a failed state, and the nature 
of Somali piracy and found that:
[t]he absence of any national administration means that any attempt to intervene by diplomatic 
means is fraught with difficulty. Equally any concept of military intervention involves legal and tech-
nical difficulties, leaving aside the risk to captured crews. In short the only realistic and effective 
manner of obtaining the release of a vessel is the negotiation and payment of a ransom. 
From a victim’s perspective, the reasoning is significant as it not only highlights that ransom pay-
ments are the ‘only’ realistic method of protecting seafarers, but it also explicitly states that diplo-
matic and military interventions can be useful alternatives, albeit not the most effective ones for se-
curing the release of hostages. On appeal, Lord Justice Rix also acknowledged that piracy threatens 
the liberty and lives of seafarers, further indicating that the human rights of seafarers are constantly 
at risk.84 The Court relied on the aforementioned report of the European Union Committee of the 
House of Lords, and especially on excerpts that focus on the vitality of ransom payments for the 
protection of the lives of seafarers, before concluding that ransom payments are compatible with 
public policy.85
82  House of Lords - European Union Committee, ‘Combating Somali Piracy: the EU’s Naval Operation Atalanta - 12th 
Report of Session 2009–10’ (2010) 58.
83  Masefield AG v Amlin Corporate Member Ltd [2010] EWHC 280.
84  ibid para 71.
85  ibid paras 67-70.
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3.3 Flag state human rights obligations and ransom payments 
The ECtHR and UK courts have discussed the importance of negotiations and ransom payments 
respectively, while the shipping industry has insisted on the payment of ransoms for securing the 
release of seafarers taken hostage. However, ransom payments have not been recognised as a binding 
obligation imposed on flag states. It is, however, worth questioning how flag states will respond to 
the positive obligations they have towards those seized on board vessels flying their flags if ransom 
payments are banned.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) have been interpreted to apply on board vessels. Article 2(1) ICCPR stip-
ulates that ‘[e]ach state Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present 
Covenant’ and therefore states have the obligation to respect and ensure the rights laid down in the 
Covenant to anyone under their effective control, even if not situated within the territory of the State 
Party. 86 In light of these obligations, it has been argued that ‘for the Covenant purposes, a flag state 
may have obligations towards those on board a registered ship even though he or she is outside the 
territory of the state party because the victim is still subject to the state’s jurisdiction due to being on 
a registered vessel.’87 In Bankovic, the ECtHR addressed the application of the ECHR to vessels and 
the human rights obligations towards those on board vessels flying the flags of the Council of Europe 
member states. Despite the notoriously restrictive approach taken by the Court in Bankovic, it con-
firmed that a state has jurisdiction over a vessel flying its flag.88 In its later jurisprudence, the Court 
developed the extraterritorial application of the Convention arguing that a state has jurisdiction for 
the purposes of Article 1 ECHR when it exercises effective spatial or personal control beyond its 
borders.89 With regards to the protection of human rights at sea, the Court has found that states have 
to comply with their Convention obligations when their state agents intercept persons at sea.90
86  HRC ‘General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’ 
(26 May 2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, para 10. See also HRC ‘Concluding Observations: Israel’ (21 August 
2003) UN Doc CCPR/CO/78/ISR. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has also concluded that the ICCPR applies to 
occupied territories, see Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory 
Opinion) 2004 ICJ 136, 179; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v Uganda) (Judgment) 2005 
ICJ 168.
87  Khaliq (n 15) 337. 
88  Banković and Others v Belgium and other 16 Contracting States App no 52207/99 (ECtHR, 12 December 2001) paras 
67, 73.
89  For the spatial control test see Cyprus v Turkey App no 25781/94 (ECtHR, 10 May 2001) para 78; Al-Skeini and Others 
v UK App no 55721/07 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011) para 114. For the personal control test see Öcalan v Turkey App no 46221/99 
(ECtHR, 12 May 2005) para 91; Hassan v UK App no 29750/09 (ECtHR, 16 September 2014) para 76.
90  Medvedyev and Others v France App no 3394/03 (ECtHR, 10 July 2008) paras 65-69; Rigopoulos v Spain App no 
37388/97 (ECtHR, 12 January 1999); Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy App no 7765/09 (ECtHR, 23 February 2012) para 81. 
See also Anna Petrig, Human Rights and Law Enforcement at Sea: Arrest, Detention and Transfer of Piracy Suspects (Brill 
2014) 139-45.  
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Given that flag states have jurisdiction on board vessels for the purposes of the ICCPR and the 
ECHR, the next question that should be addressed is the nature of the flag states’ obligations. That 
is to say, it should be determined whether the extraterritorial obligations of flag states extend to 
respecting human rights on board a vessel (to refrain from breaching human rights) or to protecting 
human rights on board a vessel (to prevent or put an end to inferences with the enjoyment of human 
rights caused by third parties) or both. General Comment 31 clearly indicates that states have both 
negative (to respect human rights) and positive (to protect human rights) obligations when they ex-
ercise jurisdiction extraterritorially.91 Under the ECHR, states also have both negative and positive 
extraterritorial human rights obligations.92 However, there are two important qualifications that ap-
ply to positive human rights obligations. The first is that states do not have to secure the whole range 
of rights protected under the Convention, but the protection they offer depends on the jurisdiction 
states exercise extraterritorially. As the ECtHR put it, ‘the Convention rights can be tailored and 
divided.’93 The other qualification is that states are expected to prevent or put an end to inferences 
with human rights by third parties only when they ‘know or ought to have known’ that individuals 
are at risk.94 
So how can these human rights obligations be translated in the context of piracy? It is now widely 
accepted that seafarers transiting the HRA are at risk.95 It has therefore been argued that flag states 
might be in breach of their human rights obligations if they fail to take appropriate preventive meas-
ures against the seizure of the vessel and crew or fail to put an end to hostage-taking of seafarers.96 
While flag states are not expected to protect the full spectrum of human rights on board vessels, they 
still have to prevent or put an end to breaches of the right to life and freedom from torture, in addition 
to conducting independent and effective investigations into breaches of these rights.97 If a blanket 
ban on ransom payments is introduced, it is hard to see how flag states will be able to comply with 
their positive human rights obligations towards seafarers. As discussed above, diplomatic means or 
rescue missions can be used, but ransom payments remain the only effective tool flag states have to 
secure the release of seafarers taken hostage. 
91  HRC ‘General Comment No. 31’ (n 86) para 10.
92  A and Others v UK App no 3455/05 (ECtHR, 19 February 2009) para 22; Z and Others v UK App no 29392/95 (ECtHR, 
10 May 2001) paras 73-74. See also Alastair Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations Under the European Con-
vention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2004). 
93  Al-Skeini (2011) para 137. 
94  Osman v UK EHRR 1998-VIII (ECtHR, 28 October 1998) para 115; Opuz v Turkey App no 33401/02 (ECtHR, 9 
June 2009) para 148; A and Others v UK (2009) para 22; Z and Others v UK (2001) paras 73-74; E and Others v UK App 
no33218/96 (ECtHR, 26 November 2002) para 22.
95  Evans and Galani (n 15) 356; Galani (n 15) 81-82.
96  Stefano Piedimonte Bodini, ‘Fighting Maritime Piracy under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) EJIL 
829, 839; Efthymios Papastavridis, ‘European Convention on Human Rights and the Law of the Sea: The Strasbourg Court in 
Unchartered Waters?’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Panos Merkouris (eds), The Interpretation and Application of the ECHR – 
Legal and Practical Implications (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013) 129-30; Tom Obokata, ‘Maritime piracy as a violation 
of human rights: a way forward for its effective prevention and suppression?’ (2013) 17 The International Journal of Human 
Rights 18, 27.
97  Jaloud v Netherlands App no 47708/08 (ECtHR, 20 November 2014) paras 154, 183-228.
MarSafeLaw Journal 3/2017
Implications of a Piracy Ransom Ban
40
Flag states bound by the ECHR bear another human rights obligation relevant to piracy: not to ex-
pose individuals to ill-treatment or other human rights violations, even if such treatment is imposed 
by non-state actors.98 A ban on ransom payments could lead to two different, but both unwanted, 
outcomes. First, states would not be able to continue sending their vessels to seas contaminated by 
piracy, as it would expose individuals to risk without being able to offer them any adequate safe-
guards if they are taken hostage. Second, seafarers could also refuse to transit areas affected by pira-
cy, as they would know that shipowners and states will be barred from securing their release through 
a ransom payment. Such a restriction would cause unprecedented financial damage to the shipping 
industry, as the bulk of world trade is carried by sea through straits and seas prone to pirate attacks.99 
Seafarers sent to transit areas affected by piracy and taken hostage might be destined to perish, as 
the most effective method of release - ransom payments - would be banned. 
It cannot be said that extending the human rights obligations of states on ships flying their flag is 
uncontroversial. To begin, the operation and manning of vessels by private ship companies suggests 
that flag states do not have effective control over what occurs on board a vessel.100 It is also hard to 
argue that the drafters of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
had human rights obligations in mind when they agreed that vessels are subjected to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of their flag state on the high seas (Article 92) and the latter has to effectively exercise 
this jurisdiction (Article 94) by ensuring respect for international rules and standards.101 However, 
piracy has been an illuminative example of the challenges that human rights face in the 21st century 
and it is therefore imperative that human rights be protected in the maritime domain. There is an 
emerging consensus that the UNCLOS is a living instrument and should be interpreted to address 
human rights challenges at sea.102 At the same time, it has been argued that the ICCPR and the ECHR 
should not be interpreted in a legal vacuum.103 In light of these developments, combined with the 
increasing threats faced by seafarers, this article submits that an absolute ban on piracy ransom pay-
ments cannot be reconciled with the human rights obligations of flag states towards seafarers seized 
on board vessels flying their flags, and flag states should carefully consider the welfare of seafarers 
in the fight against piracy. 
98  Soering v UK App no 14038/88 (ECtHR, 7 July 1989) para 91; Chahal v UK App no 22414/93 (ECtHR, 15 November 
1996) para 80, Saadi v Italy App no 37201/06 (ECtHR, 28 February 2008) para 138. On this analogy, see also Galani (n 15) 
81-82.
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100  Khaliq (n 15) 339-43.
101  For the duties of flag states see Richard Barnes, ‘Flag States’ in Donald Rothwell and others (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of the Law of the Sea (OUP 2015) 304-24. 
102  Khaliq (n 15) 339-40. See also Tulio Treves, ‘Human Rights and the Law of the Sea’ (2010) 28 Berkeley Journal of 
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gia App no 71503/01 (ECtHR, 8 April 2004) para 137; see also George Letsas, ‘The Truth in Autonomous Concepts: How 
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4. Ransom ban: ending piracy or shipping interests? 
A ban on ransom payments to pirates would not only affect the protection of seafarers, but also 
the financial interests of shipowners and the international shipping industry as a whole. Shipowners 
and insurers will not be allowed to pay ransoms to secure the release of vessels, cargos or crews. It is 
doubtful whether the UK could justify such a move on either financial or legal grounds. As will be 
explained, if a ban on ransoms is implemented, the economic cost of piracy could be much higher 
than it is now. It is also questioned how such a ban will comply with the MIA 1906 - as it currently 
stands and is being interpreted by UK courts - meaning that the UK might have to reform its statu-
tory provisions if a ban is implemented. 
4.1 The economic cost of piracy before and after a ban on ransoms
Admittedly, the economic cost of piracy has increased over the last decade and has adversely 
affected international shipping interests. A decade ago, when pirate attacks began increasing, the 
shipping industry faced reproach for failing to effectively respond to piracy.104 However, over the 
years these allegations proved to be untrue by the costly counter-piracy measures implemented by 
the shipping industry and its intense efforts to protect their vessels and crews against piracy. For 
example, the economic cost of African piracy between 2010 and 2015 was estimated to be about 
$21.1 billion, of which almost $15.5 million was covered by the shipping industry itself.105 These 
costs included marine insurance, labour expenses, security equipment, guards and increased speed 
costs.106 The addition of ransom payments further demonstrate the astronomical expenses that the 
shipping industry has assumed to protect its interests against piracy. It is estimated that between 
$340 million and $435 million was paid in the form of ransoms for ships and/or seafarers kidnapped 
by Somali pirates between 2005 and 2015.107 Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) also estimated that $1.6 
million was paid in ransoms to recover hostages abducted by pirates in West Africa in 2015.108 An 
estimated total of $8.5 million is the reported loss the shipping industry sustained in stolen goods 
and cargo by pirates in the West Africa and Southeast Asia regions in 2016.109
The reported costs of maritime piracy make it undeniable that piracy, and especially the criminal 
business of hostage-taking, has yielded huge profits for pirate gangs and caused significant financial 
damages to the shipping industry. It is these costs, and especially the ransom payments, that have 
compelled the US and UK to advocate in favour of an absolute ban on ransom payments.110 Howev-
104  House of Commons - Foreign Affairs Committee (n 40) at 111. 
105  OBP (2016) (n 61) 15-22, 31-37; OBP (2014) (n 8) 7-37, 54-64; OBP, The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2012 (2013) 
1-72; OBP, The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011 (2012) 1-61.
106  ibid.
107  See (n 8). 
108  OBP (2016) (n 61) 32. 
109  ibid 36, 49. 
110  See Section 2.3 above. 
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er, what has not been reported is an estimate of the cost of piracy had the ransom ban been in place. 
For example, the value of the Bunga Melati Dua and her cargo was $80 million, but the vessel was 
released in exchange for a $2 million ransom, which is only a small fraction of the actual value of the 
vessel.111 The last commercial vessel, MT Smyrni, seized by Somalis was released in 2013 for a ran-
som that reportedly totalled $13 million.112 While the exorbitant ransom was extensively reported, 
what failed to receive equal attention was the fact that the vessel was carrying 135,000 metric tonnes 
of Azerbaijan crude oil with a market value of approximately $130 million.113 Unfortunately, there 
does not appear to be any collected information on the actual value of the seized vessels and the mar-
ket value of cargos. Although it can still be argued that, had a ban been in place, the financial damage 
caused by the seizures of the Bunga Melati Dua and the MT Smyrni alone would have amounted to 
$210 million, without calculating the actual value of the MT Smyrni. This amount equals over half 
of the total sum paid to Somali pirates for the release of 152 vessels hijacked between 2005 and 
2012.114 This suggests that while the ransoms demanded by pirates seem extortionate, they remain a 
manageable cost for the shipping industry. 
In addition, the claim of those who advocate for a ransom ban that the economic cost of piracy 
will decrease when ransom payments end is speculative at best. There is no guarantee that pirates 
who currently employ the ‘kidnap for ransom’ model will not turn to other models of piracy, such 
as those in West Africa, where pirates seize oil tankers for their cargo,115 or in Southeast Asia, where 
the crews are murdered and vessels are being renamed, registered as new and sold.116 This means that 
pirates will carry on making profits from seizing vessels, while shipowners will be unable to secure 
the release of their crews and vessels. Whereas shipowners could save the costs of ransom payments, 
they would sustain greater costs by the loss of their vessels and cargos. At the same time, the costs 
of counter-piracy measures would likely remain high or could increase even further, as the shipping 
industry would have to take all possible precautions to protect their vessels knowing that hijacked 
vessels will be irretrievably lost following a ban on ransoms. 
Given the financial crisis that hit the maritime sector at the beginning of 2016, a discussion of the 
financial implications of a ransom ban for the shipping industry is highly topical.117 The Baltic Dry 
Index, which measures the cost of shipping raw materials such as iron ore, coal and grains, plum-
meted to all-time lows during the first two months of 2016.118 The shipping crisis coincided with the 
economic slowdown in China, the world’s largest consumer of commodities, which is therefore con-
111  Masefield AG (2011) para 11.
112  UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of 
Somalia’ (21 October 2013) UN Doc S/2013/623, para 6.
113  OceanusLive.org, ‘Tankers Royal Grace and Smyrni Released by Somali Pirates’ (9 March 2013) <www.oceanuslive.
org/main/viewnews.aspx?uid=00000660> accessed 26 February 2017. For more case studies, see the FAFT Report (n 7) 11-
12, 14-16.
114  World Bank (n 8) 41.
115  For piracy in the coasts of West Africa see Marts (n 58) 9-11, Murphy (n 3) 61-90.
116  Ong (n 3) 270-75; Beckman (n 64) 14-16.
117  Palmer (n 3) 210-21.
118  DryShips Inc. <www.dryships.com/pages/report.php> accessed 26 February 2017.
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sidered to be the main cause of the crisis.119 The rapid expansion of more efficient and energy-saving 
fleets that followed the increase in oil prices resulted in a number of vessels failing to make any 
profits and struggling to repay interest on their debts.120 This has put banks’ lending portfolios under 
huge pressure without excluding the possibility of distressed sales or seizure of vessels, as happened 
with Hanjin Shipping’s bankruptcy.121 Maritime analysts have not linked the 2016 shipping crisis 
with counter-piracy related costs or the premiums that shipowners have been paying to insure the 
vessels and crews against pirate attacks. However, it is difficult to ignore that the shipping industry 
was already under huge financial pressure due to piracy just before the crisis hit. In 2015 alone, the 
economic cost of African piracy was almost $1.7 billion of which $1.2 billion was industry, labour 
and insurance costs.122 It is therefore argued that an absolute ban on ransom payments could cause 
further needless financial uncertainty and turmoil to the maritime sector by, inter alia, increasing the 
likelihood that brand new vessels will be irretrievably lost - despite not having turned a profit due to 
the remaining interest or capital debts. 
It is also hard to see how the UK government would justify such a ban and the resulting conse-
quential losses to the UK marine insurance industry. While the UK might no longer be one of the 
big international fleet owners, UK banks remain huge players in shipping finance. For example, in 
2015, the Royal Bank of Scotland had total loan exposures of £8.3 billion (GBP) and Lloyd’s gross 
written premium for marine liability was £2.2 million.123 An absolute ban would restrict Kidnap & 
Ransom (K&R) policies or other policies that cover ransom payments either in the UK or abroad, 
which would make it extremely difficult for lenders to be repaid for hijacked vessels that cannot be 
retrieved.124 This is not to say that foreign marine insurance businesses would face the same prob-
lems, as it is unclear how, if at all, an international ransom ban would be enforced.125 Thus, while the 
financial interests of the UK shipping industry would steadily decline, other states that have proven 
themselves to be more flexible in maritime business and where open registries and flag of conveni-
ences operate - such as Liberia and Panama - could transform into marine insurance hubs. 
119  Berenberg Aspekte, ‘Causes of the Shipping Crisis’ (2016) <www.berenberg.de/fileadmin/user_upload/beren-
berg2013/01_Private_Banking/Kompetenzzentren/20160321_aspekte_Maritime_2_Shipping_Crisis.pdf> accessed 19 Feb-
ruary 2017.
120  John Ficenec, ‘Zombie ships send maritime freight into worst crisis in living memory’ (The Telegraph, 22 January 2016) 
<www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/12108453/Zombie-ships-send-maritime-freight-into-worst-crisis-in-living-memory.html> 
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In light of these considerations, the argument that a ban on ransom payments could minimise the 
profits of piracy, yet increase the financial benefits of the shipping industry, are ill-founded. The 
nature of modern piracy is continuously evolving and highly adaptive, which means that pirates will 
remain a threat to maritime commerce even after an absolute ban is agreed. At the same time, the ban 
could have severe financial implications for an already financially unstable maritime industry, which 
have received no consideration by the advocates of a ransom ban. 
4.2 The MIA 1906 and a ban on ransom payments 
In addition to the weak arguments that a ban on ransom payments could reduce the costs of piracy 
for international shipping and eliminate piracy, further legal questions arise as to how the ban would 
fit within the current interpretation of the MIA 1906.126 In the Bunga Melati Dua case, legal issues 
arising from the capture of a vessel by pirates were examined. The UK court interpreted the policies 
under the MIA 1906 and concluded that the seizure of a vessel by pirates is not an actual total loss, 
as the insured vessel is not destroyed nor so damaged as to cease to be a thing of the kind insured, or 
an asset irretrievably lost.127 The seizure was neither a constructive total loss, which happens only in 
cases in which ‘the subject-matter insured is reasonably abandoned on account of its actual total loss 
appearing to be unavoidable, or because it could not be preserved from actual total loss without an 
expenditure which would exceed its value when the expenditure had been incurred’.128 Both conclu-
sions were justified on the basis that pirates seize vessels with the intention of extracting a ransom 
and, once the ransom is paid, the vessel, cargo and crew return to the shipowners.129 At the same 
time, it has been concluded that when a sue and labour clause exists in a policy, ‘it is the duty of the 
assured and his agents, in all cases, to take such measures as may be reasonable for the purpose of 
averting or minimising a loss’.130 In the context of piracy, the term ‘reasonable’ has been interpreted 
to include the payment of a ransom with due regard to the value of the vessel and cargo.131 
In light of the proposed ban, it remains questionable how the MIA 1906 will be implemented and 
interpreted if the ban is realised. Would the seizure of the vessel be treated as an actual total loss? 
Such an interpretation would cause premiums to increase sharply resulting in even higher costs for 
ship and cargo owners. Additionally, how would the term ‘reasonable’ be defined? If ransoms are 
forbidden, would the shipowners be expected to take alternative forms of reasonable actions to mit-
igate losses? And what would these actions be: negotiations, rescue missions, or compromises other 
126  For the development of piracy as a peril insured under the MIA 1906 see Gotthard Gauci, ‘Piracy and its Legal Problems: 
With Specific Reference to the English Law of Marine Insurance’ (2010) 41 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 541, 
544-52; Douse (n 124) 278-86; Soady (n 16) 1-4. 
127  Section 57(1) MIA 1906; Masefield AG (2011) para 56. 
128  Section 60(1) MIA 1906; Masefield AG (2010) para 66. 
129  See also the relevant commentary in Gauci (n 126) 552-58; Kate Lewins and Robert Merkin, ‘Masefield AG v Amlin 
Corporate Member Ltd; The Bunga Melati Dua - Piracy, Ransom and Marine Insurance’ (2011) 35 Melbourne University 
Law Review 717, 726-33; Paul Todd, ‘Maritime Fraud and Piracy’ (London, Lloyd’s List, 2010) 22-24; Soady (n 16) 16-25. 
130  Section 78(4) MIA 1906.
131  See Section 2.3 above. 
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than monetary concessions? Despite the criticism that the MIA 1906 might not be consistent with 
modern commercial law practices, it remains one of the most influential pieces of marine insurance 
law worldwide as it has been in force for more than a century and has had all its provisions judicially 
tested.132 It is therefore difficult to see how a ban on ransom payments could fit within the provisions 
of the MIA 1906 and the judicial interpretation of these provisions by the UK courts without affect-
ing commercial certainty.133 
It has also been established that the crew cannot be insured under a hull or cargo policy, and while 
a ransom paid for the crew might be recovered, the best way for a shipowner to secure their release 
without sustaining financial damage is through K&R policies.134 Nevertheless, if the UK were to im-
plement a ban similar to that imposed on terrorists, K&R policies would be criminalised. As a result, 
shipowners will not be able to rescue their crews nor could they recover losses sustained by having 
to compensate the victims.135 The adverse impact of the lack of a K&R policy on seafarers taken 
hostage has been confirmed in the grimmest of ways as the hostages who have spent the longest time 
in captivity were those on whom there was no K&R policy and the shipowners refused to assume the 
financial burden of paying a ransom for their release.136 On top of all this, the severe human rights 
violations, discussed above, that seafarers would suffer cannot be overlooked as a ransom ban would 
lessen the likelihood of securing the release of those taken hostage. 
5. Conclusion 
In an era when terrorist hostage-taking poses a significant threat to innocent victims and generates 
a considerable profit for terrorist groups, a ban on ransom payments to terrorists is an expected re-
action. This is not to say that the same approach should be applied to the seizure of vessels and crew 
members by pirates. Maritime piracy operates in a commercial environment and a ban on ransom 
payments would likely have an adverse impact on international shipping. This article examined the 
existing international and national policies on ransom payments and clarified that, for the time be-
ing, there has been no universal ban on ransom payments to pirates and such payments remain legal 
and compatible with public policy in the UK. It was also explained that ransom payments are vital 
for the protection of seafarers, who have become targets of modern piracy. 
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An examination of the evolving human rights framework, and more specifically the positive human 
rights obligations of flag states, demonstrated that it will be challenging for flag states to comply with 
their human rights obligations if a ransom ban is implemented. In addition to the human rights 
implications for the protection of seafarers, the discussion on the adverse commercial impact of a 
ransom ban on the international shipping industry concluded that a ban could increase costs for the 
shipping industry, as vessels and crews would be irretrievably lost. The issue would become even 
more complicated in the UK, given that the current interpretation of the MIA 1906 not only permits 
ransom payments, but it also requires the shipowner to negotiate the release of the vessel and crew 
by agreeing to a ransom before relying on insurance. A universal ban on ransom payments seems 
utopian, and the UK plan to restrict ransom payments to pirates, similar to the restrictions imposed 
in the context of terrorism, would only give rise to more inconsistencies and put the interests of the 
UK marine industry at risk. It is therefore concluded that the arguments that an absolute ban on ran-
som payments to pirates could eliminate piracy and protect the interests of the international shipping 
industry are ill-founded and this policy is not fit for purpose. 
